Bentham and Kant

Bentham's utilitarianism#

StandardAQA 7062/1 Section B: Bentham and KantDfE GCE Religious Studies subject content

Bentham's utilitarian decision-procedure

Fig. 1From the principle of utility, the hedonic calculus measures net pleasure to identify the act producing the greatest happiness.

Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), is a teleological, consequentialist and hedonistic theory built on a single principle. It begins from a psychological claim: 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure' — human beings are motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. From this Bentham derives the principle of utility (or the greatest happiness principle): an action is right in proportion as it tends to promote happiness (pleasure), and wrong as it tends to promote the reverse; the morally right action is the one that produces 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. Because only pleasure is intrinsically good and only pain intrinsically bad, morality is reduced to a calculation of the net balance of pleasure over pain that an action produces for all affected.

To make this calculation Bentham devised the hedonic (or felicific) calculus — a method for measuring and comparing the quantity of pleasure and pain an action will cause. He identified seven factors to weigh: intensity (how strong the pleasure/pain), duration (how long it lasts), certainty (how likely it is to occur), propinquity (how soon it will come), fecundity (the chance it will be followed by more of the same), purity (the chance it will not be followed by the opposite), and extent (how many people are affected). By totting up the pleasures and subtracting the pains, across everyone affected, one can in principle determine which action yields the greatest net happiness and is therefore right. The calculus embodies Bentham's egalitarian conviction that 'each is to count for one, and none for more than one' — everyone's happiness counts equally.

Bentham's theory is a form of act utilitarianism: it applies the principle of utility directly to each individual act, asking of every particular action which choice will maximise happiness in this situation. There are no absolute rules; a rule (do not lie, do not kill) is at most a useful rule of thumb summarising past experience of what tends to maximise happiness, and can always be overridden if breaking it produces more happiness on this occasion. This makes the theory maximally flexible and responsive to circumstances, but also, as critics note, potentially permissive of shocking acts if they happen to maximise utility.

The appeal of Bentham's utilitarianism is considerable. It is democratic and egalitarian (everyone's happiness counts equally, which was radical in an age of privilege — Bentham used it to argue for prison reform, animal welfare and against slavery), it is secular and rational (it needs no appeal to God or intuition, only to the empirical facts of pleasure and pain), it takes consequences and human welfare seriously (surely morality should care about happiness and suffering?), and it offers a clear, single decision-procedure. Its weaknesses — the difficulty of the calculation, the problem of unjust acts that maximise utility, and the crudity of measuring all value as quantity of pleasure — are the subject of the next section and drove Mill's revisions.

Worked example

Applying the hedonic calculus

Use the hedonic calculus to assess whether a town should build a park on public land currently used for a car park.

Identify those affected
Park users (recreation, health), drivers who lose parking, local residents, the wider community (extent).
Weigh the pleasures
The park's pleasures are intense for some, long in duration and fecund (health, community), and extensive (many benefit over years).
Weigh the pains
Lost parking causes inconvenience — real but arguably less intense, and reducible if alternative parking is provided.
Sum across everyone
Counting each person equally, the durable, extensive, fecund pleasures of the park likely outweigh the concentrated inconvenience of lost parking.
Verdict
On the calculus the park maximises net happiness and is therefore the right choice — though the calculation is uncertain and ignores any right the displaced drivers might claim.

Result: The calculus supports building the park because its extensive, durable pleasures outweigh the concentrated inconvenience, illustrating both utilitarianism's practical usefulness and its reliance on uncertain, contestable estimates of pleasure and pain.

Typical mistakes

Summarising utilitarianism as 'the greatest good for the greatest number' loosely — Bentham's good is pleasure/happiness specifically, measured by the calculus.
Attributing higher/lower pleasures to Bentham; that is Mill's qualitative revision, whereas Bentham's calculus is purely quantitative.

Active revision

Explain Bentham's utilitarianism, including the principle of utility and the hedonic calculus. (Structured AO1 response)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for religious studies (Department for Education)

Strengths and critiques of utilitarianism#

StandardAQA 7062/1 Section B: Bentham and KantDfE GCE Religious Studies subject content

Varieties of utilitarianism

Fig. 2Utilitarianism divides by what is maximised (quantity vs quality of pleasure) and by what is assessed (acts vs rules).

The strengths of utilitarianism are real and account for its enduring influence. It is impartial and egalitarian (everyone's welfare counts equally), it takes the consequences of actions and the reality of human and animal suffering seriously, it is empirical and secular (grounding morality in the measurable facts of welfare rather than in contested religious or intuitive claims), and it provides a clear, single principle for resolving moral questions and guiding public policy — cost-benefit analysis in economics and public health (e.g. QALYs in medicine) is broadly utilitarian. Its focus on maximising wellbeing captures a powerful intuition that morality should make life go better for sentient beings.

But it faces four classic objections. First, the problem of calculation: it is often impossible to predict and measure all the consequences of an action for everyone affected, so the calculus may be impractical or paralysing, and we cannot reliably compare one person's pleasure with another's. Second, the problem of justice and rights: because only aggregate happiness matters, utilitarianism can in principle justify grave injustice to individuals if it maximises overall utility — punishing an innocent person to prevent a riot, or exploiting a minority for the majority's benefit — since it counts only the total, not its distribution. Third, the swine objection: by reducing all value to pleasure, Bentham's theory seems to value the pleasures of a contented pig as much as those of a dissatisfied philosopher, and to make gross or sadistic pleasures count so long as they are intense — 'a doctrine worthy only of swine', as Mill's critics charged.

John Stuart Mill, in Utilitarianism (1863), revised the theory to meet these objections, especially the swine objection. He introduced a qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures: the pleasures of the intellect, imagination and moral sentiments (poetry, friendship, understanding) are intrinsically superior to the bodily pleasures, and their quality, not merely their quantity, should count. His test is the preference of 'competent judges' who have experienced both: they prefer the higher pleasures, so that 'it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.' Mill also moved towards rule utilitarianism (though the interpretation is debated): rather than calculating each act, we should follow the rules whose general observance tends to maximise happiness (do not lie, do not kill), which protects justice and rights and eases the calculation problem, since these rules have proven their utility over time.

The distinction between act and rule utilitarianism is the key evaluative development. Act utilitarianism (Bentham) assesses each act directly and is flexible but vulnerable to the justice objection (it can justify a one-off injustice) and the calculation problem. Rule utilitarianism (a Millian development) assesses acts by rules that generally maximise utility, protecting rights and justice and easing calculation, but at the cost of some flexibility and facing the charge of 'rule-worship' (if breaking the rule would clearly maximise happiness in this case, why not break it? — and if we allow exceptions, rule utilitarianism collapses back into act utilitarianism). Mill's higher/lower pleasures answer the swine objection but arguably abandon strict hedonism (by what non-pleasure standard is one pleasure 'higher'?). Whether these revisions rescue utilitarianism or concede too much to its critics is the central evaluative question, and it frames the contrast with Kant, who rejects consequences altogether.

Worked example

The injustice objection and rule utilitarianism

Assess whether rule utilitarianism escapes the objection that utilitarianism can justify punishing an innocent person.

State the objection
Act utilitarianism could justify framing an innocent person to prevent a riot, if that maximises net happiness — an injustice.
The rule-utilitarian reply
A rule permitting the punishment of the innocent would, if generally followed, undermine trust and security and reduce happiness overall; so the rule 'never punish the innocent' maximises utility and should be kept.
The rule-worship problem
But if in this specific case framing the innocent really would maximise happiness, why follow the rule? Following it then seems irrational 'rule-worship'.
The collapse dilemma
If we allow exceptions whenever breaking the rule maximises utility, rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism and the injustice returns.
Judgement
Rule utilitarianism mitigates the injustice objection in ordinary cases but cannot fully escape it without either rule-worship or collapse — a genuine dilemma.

Result: Rule utilitarianism reduces the injustice objection by protecting rights through general rules, but faces the dilemma of rule-worship or collapse into act utilitarianism, so it softens rather than removes the charge that utilitarianism can sacrifice the individual to the aggregate.

Typical mistakes

Attributing rule utilitarianism to Bentham; Bentham is an act utilitarian, and the rule move is a later (Millian) development.
Claiming higher/lower pleasures fully rescue hedonism; critics argue ranking pleasures by 'quality' smuggles in a non-pleasure standard of value.

Active revision

'Utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of individuals.' Assess this view. (Extended essay)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for religious studies (Department for Education)

Kant's deontology#

AdvancedAQA 7062/1 Section B: Bentham and KantDfE GCE Religious Studies subject content

Kant's categorical imperative test

Fig. 3A maxim is tested by universalising it; if universalisation is self-contradictory, the action is forbidden as a matter of duty.

Immanuel Kant's ethics, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), is deontological, absolutist and rationalist — the polar opposite of utilitarianism. Kant grounds morality not in consequences or feelings but in reason and duty. He begins from the claim that the only thing good without qualification is a good will: intelligence, courage and even happiness can be used for evil, but a good will is good in itself, whatever it achieves. A good will acts from duty — from respect for the moral law — not from inclination, self-interest or the desire for good consequences. The moral worth of an action lies in its motive: to help another because it is your duty has moral worth; to help because you feel like it, or to gain advantage, does not. Morality is thus about acting for the right reason, not producing the right result.

Kant distinguishes two kinds of imperative (command of reason). A hypothetical imperative commands an action as a means to some end you happen to want: 'if you want to be healthy, exercise' — it binds only if you have the end. A categorical imperative commands an action as good in itself, unconditionally, binding on all rational beings regardless of their desires: 'do not lie', 'keep your promises'. Moral duties are categorical imperatives. Kant then argues that there is really one supreme Categorical Imperative, the fundamental principle of morality, which he formulates in several ways that he regards as equivalent.

The first formulation is the formula of universal law: 'act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. To test whether an action is permissible, universalise its maxim (the principle on which you act) and ask whether it could hold as a law for everyone without contradiction. A maxim that cannot be universalised without contradiction is forbidden: the maxim 'I may make a lying promise when convenient' cannot be universalised, because if everyone did so, the institution of promising would collapse and lying promises become impossible — the maxim contradicts itself when made universal. The second formulation is the formula of humanity (the end in itself): 'act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never merely as a means'. Persons, as rational agents, have absolute worth (dignity) and must never be used merely as tools for others' purposes — which grounds human rights and directly opposes utilitarianism's willingness to sacrifice individuals for the aggregate. The third formulation, the kingdom of ends, bids us act as legislating members of a community in which everyone is treated as an end.

Kant's ethics also involves the postulates of practical reason and the summum bonum. The summum bonum (highest good) is the state in which perfect virtue is united with the perfect happiness it deserves. Since we are commanded to pursue it, and 'ought implies can', its achievement must be possible; but it is not achievable in this life (the virtuous often suffer). Kant therefore argues that morality rationally requires us to postulate three things: freedom (we must be free to be bound by duty), immortality (an afterlife in which the soul can progress towards perfect virtue), and God (who can proportion happiness to virtue and so bring about the summum bonum). These are not proofs of God and immortality but postulates — presuppositions that practical reason must make for morality to be coherent — and they give Kant's austere rational ethics a religious dimension: God is required not as the source of moral commands (morality is autonomous, grounded in reason) but as the guarantor that virtue and happiness finally coincide.

Worked example

Applying the categorical imperative to a lying promise

Use Kant's formula of universal law to test whether I may make a promise I intend to break to get money.

State the maxim
'Whenever I need money, I will promise to repay it, intending not to repay.'
Universalise it
Imagine everyone in need acts on this maxim as a universal law.
Test for contradiction
If everyone made lying promises, no one would believe promises, so the institution of promising would collapse — and the maxim, which relies on promises being believed, becomes impossible. This is a contradiction in conception.
Derive the duty
Since the maxim cannot be universalised without contradiction, making a lying promise is forbidden — a perfect duty, admitting no exception, whatever the good consequences.
Cross-check with humanity formula
The lying promise also treats the lender merely as a means to my money, violating the formula of humanity — confirming the verdict.

Result: The lying promise fails both the universal-law test (it is self-contradictory when universalised) and the humanity test (it uses the lender merely as a means), so for Kant it is absolutely forbidden regardless of the benefit — illustrating the theory's rigour and its contrast with utilitarianism.

Typical mistakes

Confusing the categorical with the hypothetical imperative, or reducing Kant to 'the golden rule' — universalisability is about maxims not being self-contradictory when universalised, not about not liking to be treated so.
Saying Kant grounds morality in God's commands; for Kant morality is autonomous (grounded in reason), and God is a postulate for the summum bonum, not the source of duty.

Active revision

Explain Kant's categorical imperative and its three formulations. (Structured AO1 response)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for religious studies (Department for Education)

Strengths and critiques of Kant#

AdvancedAQA 7062/1 Section B: Bentham and KantDfE GCE Religious Studies subject content

Hypothetical and categorical imperatives

Fig. 4Hypothetical imperatives command means to desired ends; categorical imperatives command unconditionally, and are the form of moral duty.

Kant's ethics has powerful strengths. It grounds morality in reason, giving it a universality and objectivity that feelings- or consequence-based theories lack: moral duties bind all rational beings equally. It protects the individual absolutely through the formula of humanity — persons have dignity and may never be used merely as means — which grounds human rights and directly blocks the utilitarian sacrifice of the individual for the aggregate. It captures the intuition that motive matters (we praise the person who helps from duty, not merely from self-interest), and that some acts (torturing the innocent, genocide) are simply wrong whatever the consequences, which many find a decisive advantage over utilitarianism. And its clarity and consistency give firm, exceptionless guidance rather than an uncertain calculation of outcomes.

But Kant's rigour generates its own difficulties. The most famous is the problem of conflicting duties: because duties are absolute and admit no exceptions, Kant seems to have no way to resolve cases where two duties conflict — the classic 'inquiring murderer', who asks where your friend is hiding. Kant notoriously implies that one must not lie even to the murderer, because the duty not to lie is a perfect duty admitting no exception, which strikes most people as monstrous and shows the danger of exceptionless rules that ignore consequences. Defenders reply that Kant can distinguish duties (perfect vs imperfect) or that one can remain silent rather than lie, but the case exposes the theory's difficulty with tragic conflicts.

Further objections press hard. Kant's exclusion of consequences and inclination seems to make the theory cold and counterintuitive: it appears to deny moral worth to acts done from love or compassion (only duty confers worth), which many find a distortion of moral life (Schiller mocked that on Kant's view one should help friends with distaste, to be sure of acting from duty not inclination). The universalisability test is also charged with being either empty or manipulable: almost any act can be made permissible or forbidden by describing its maxim more or less specifically (the maxim 'lie to a murderer to save a life' might universalise without contradiction), so the test may not deliver the determinate verdicts Kant claims. And critics ask whether Kant illicitly relies on consequences after all (the contradiction in the lying-promise case seems to appeal to the bad consequence of promising collapsing).

The evaluation of Kant therefore turns on a trade-off that mirrors the one for utilitarianism, but inverted. Kant's absolutism secures justice, rights and the dignity of the individual, and honours the intuition that some acts are simply wrong — exactly where utilitarianism is weak — but at the cost of rigidity in tragic cases, an implausible exclusion of compassion and consequences, and a decision-procedure that may be less determinate than it claims. Utilitarianism's flexibility and concern for welfare are exactly where Kant is weak, but it is vulnerable to injustice and the crudity of the calculus, where Kant is strong. This complementarity — each theory strongest where the other is weakest — is the key to the comparative evaluation, and suggests that an adequate ethic may need to combine Kant's protection of the individual with a utilitarian concern for consequences, which is roughly what much of modern moral and political thought attempts.

Worked example

The inquiring murderer

Assess Kant's claim that one must not lie even to a murderer seeking a victim.

State Kant's position
Truth-telling is a perfect duty admitting no exception; so one must not lie even to the murderer, whatever the consequences.
The objection
This seems monstrous: it prioritises a rule over an innocent life, exposing the danger of exceptionless duties that ignore consequences.
Kantian replies
One may refuse to answer or stay silent (not lie); or distinguish the perfect duty not to lie from imperfect duties, or argue one is not responsible for the murderer's free choice.
Weigh
The replies mitigate but do not fully dissolve the problem: if silence is impossible and only a lie will save the life, Kant's rigour still forbids it, which most find indefensible.
Judgement
The case shows the cost of Kant's absolutism; a defensible ethic seems to need the flexibility to weigh consequences in tragic conflicts, as utilitarianism does.

Result: The inquiring-murderer case exposes the rigidity of Kant's absolutism: the Kantian replies soften it but cannot fully remove the counterintuitive result, suggesting that a good ethic must be able to weigh consequences in tragic conflicts — the very strength utilitarianism supplies.

Typical mistakes

Presenting the inquiring-murderer case without Kant's or a Kantian reply (perfect/imperfect duties; remaining silent), giving a one-sided evaluation.
Claiming Kant ignores consequences entirely while using the 'promising would collapse' contradiction, without addressing the charge that this smuggles consequences back in.

Active revision

'Kantian ethics is too rigid to be a good guide to action.' Discuss. (Extended essay)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for religious studies (Department for Education)

Comparison and evaluation#

AdvancedAQA 7062/1 Section B: Bentham and KantDfE GCE Religious Studies subject content

Bentham and Kant compared

Fig. 5Utilitarianism locates rightness in consequences and welfare; Kant in duty and the dignity of persons — opposed but complementary.

Bentham and Kant embody the sharpest contrast in normative ethics: teleological versus deontological. For Bentham, an action's rightness lies wholly in its consequences (the happiness it produces); for Kant, wholly in the action itself (its conformity to duty), consequences being morally irrelevant. For Bentham, the good (happiness) is prior and the right is what maximises it; for Kant, the right (duty) is prior and independent of any good to be produced. Bentham's theory is flexible, empirical and welfare-focused; Kant's is absolutist, rational and rights-focused. A good comparison keeps this fundamental opposition in view and then asks which better captures moral truth, using their opposed verdicts on hard cases (the sacrifice of an innocent, the lie that saves a life) to test them.

The comparison reveals that each theory's strength is precisely the other's weakness. Utilitarianism's great strength — its concern for the consequences and welfare of all, and its flexibility in tragic cases — is exactly where Kant is weak (his exclusion of consequences forbids the life-saving lie). Kant's great strength — his absolute protection of the individual's dignity and rights, and his insistence that some acts are simply wrong — is exactly where utilitarianism is weak (its willingness to sacrifice the individual for the aggregate). Utilitarianism captures the intuition that morality should care about happiness and suffering; Kant captures the intuition that persons have inviolable dignity and that motive matters. Since both intuitions are powerful, neither theory alone seems fully adequate, and the deepest problems of each are the mirror image of the other's virtues.

This suggests that the most defensible position may combine their insights rather than simply choosing one. Much modern moral and political thought does exactly this: it uses a broadly consequentialist concern for welfare (public policy, cost-benefit analysis) constrained by Kantian side-constraints of rights and dignity that may not be violated even to maximise welfare (human rights law, medical ethics' respect for autonomy). On this view utilitarianism tells us to promote wellbeing, and Kantian deontology tells us there are things we may not do to people even in the name of wellbeing — a division of labour that captures more of morality than either alone. Rule utilitarianism and Kant's own attention to which maxims we can will as universal law show the two traditions converging in practice on many rules (do not lie, do not kill, keep promises).

The most defensible A-Level judgement will take a position while honouring both intuitions. One defensible line is that Kant is closer to the truth on the fundamental point — that persons have a dignity that may not be traded away, so that justice and rights set limits that consequences cannot override — while conceding that his exclusion of consequences and compassion is too severe and that utilitarian considerations should govern within those limits. An equally defensible line is that utilitarianism's concern for actual human welfare is the sounder foundation, with rights understood as especially important rules (rule utilitarianism) rather than absolute side-constraints. What matters is a sustained argument to a conclusion, tested against concrete cases, that states which theory better captures moral truth and why, and that acknowledges the powerful intuition the other secures. The debate also feeds the dialogue between religion and ethics: both Bentham and Kant offer secular, autonomous ethics, raising the question — examined in the final topics — of whether morality needs religion at all, or whether reason (Kant) or welfare (Bentham) suffices.

Worked example

Model evaluation plan: Kant vs utilitarianism

Plan an essay comparing Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.

Thesis
Kant is closer to the truth on the inviolability of persons, but utilitarian consequences should govern within Kantian rights-limits — a principled combination.
The core contrast
Teleological (consequences/welfare) vs deontological (duty/dignity); test on the sacrifice of an innocent and the life-saving lie.
Mirror-image strengths
Utilitarianism's flexibility/welfare is Kant's weakness; Kant's protection of the individual is utilitarianism's weakness.
Argue the combination
Modern ethics uses welfare-maximisation constrained by rights side-constraints — capturing both intuitions.
Judgement
Conclude for Kantian side-constraints as the framework within which utilitarian calculation operates, conceding Kant's over-severity on compassion and tragic conflict.

Result: The most defensible verdict favours Kant's protection of the dignity of persons as setting limits that consequences cannot override, while allowing utilitarian concern for welfare to govern within those limits — a combination that captures both the intuition that some acts are simply wrong and the intuition that morality must care about happiness and suffering.

Typical mistakes

Writing two separate accounts instead of a genuine comparison structured by the teleological/deontological contrast and hard cases.
Concluding 'both have strengths and weaknesses' with no judgement; examiners require a sustained line of reasoning to a conclusion.

Active revision

'Kantian ethics is a better guide to moral behaviour than utilitarianism.' Evaluate this claim. (Extended essay)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for religious studies (Department for Education)

Key points

Applying the hedonic calculus

Key points

The injustice objection and rule utilitarianism

Key points

Applying the categorical imperative to a lying promise

Key points

The inquiring murderer

Key points

Model evaluation plan: Kant vs utilitarianism

Sources

Bentham and Kant

Key points

Applying the hedonic calculus

Key points

The injustice objection and rule utilitarianism

Key points

Applying the categorical imperative to a lying promise

Key points

The inquiring murderer

Key points

Model evaluation plan: Kant vs utilitarianism

Sources