Parliament

The structure and composition of Parliament#

FoundationAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

The House of Commons and the House of Lords compared

Fig. 1Both chambers legislate and scrutinise; they differ in legitimacy, composition and power - the Commons has primacy.

The UK Parliament is bicameral, meaning it has two chambers, and formally it is the Crown-in-Parliament - the House of Commons, the House of Lords and the monarch acting together. The House of Commons is the elected, and therefore the primary, chamber: its members (MPs) are chosen by voters in single-member constituencies through First Past the Post, giving the Commons the democratic legitimacy that the Lords lacks. The party (or coalition) that commands a majority in the Commons forms the government, and the Commons alone can force a government from office through a vote of no confidence, making it the crucial arena of political power.

The composition of the Commons reflects its political and functional roles. The government sits on one side, the Opposition on the other; ministers occupy the frontbench and the majority of MPs are backbenchers. The Speaker, elected by MPs, chairs debates with strict impartiality, protecting the rights of the House and of minority parties. Party discipline is enforced by the whips, who manage the business of the House and try to ensure MPs vote with their party; the 'payroll vote' - ministers and parliamentary private secretaries bound by collective responsibility to support the government - is a significant bloc that strengthens the executive's grip on the chamber.

The House of Lords is the appointed, unelected second chamber, and its composition is the product of centuries of accretion and partial reform. Since the House of Lords Act 1999 removed all but 92 hereditary peers, it consists mainly of life peers appointed under the Life Peerages Act 1958 (nominated by party leaders and the independent House of Lords Appointments Commission), together with the remaining hereditary peers and 26 Lords Spiritual (senior bishops of the Church of England). A large group of crossbench peers sit as independents. This composition gives the Lords considerable expertise and independence but no democratic mandate - the tension that dominates the reform debate.

The two chambers are deliberately unequal, and the inequality is constitutionally entrenched. Because the Commons is elected and the Lords is not, the Commons has primacy: the Lords cannot ultimately block legislation, only delay and revise it, and by convention it defers to the elected chamber on matters of finance and on manifesto commitments. Understanding this asymmetry - a powerful, legitimate but executive-dominated Commons and an expert, independent but unelected and subordinate Lords - is the foundation for analysing everything Parliament does.

Worked example

Why the Commons has primacy

Explain why the House of Commons is more powerful than the House of Lords.

Democratic legitimacy
The Commons is elected, giving it a mandate the appointed Lords lacks - the foundation of its authority.
Confidence and government
The government is formed from and accountable to the Commons, which alone can remove it through a vote of no confidence.
Statutory limits on the Lords
The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 restrict the Lords to delaying most legislation for about a year and bar it from delaying money bills.
Conventions
The Salisbury Convention stops the Lords blocking manifesto commitments; financial privilege reserves money matters to the Commons.

Result: The Commons is supreme because it is elected, forms and can dismiss the government, and is protected by the Parliament Acts and conventions that confine the Lords to delay and revision.

Typical mistakes

Overstating the power of the Lords - it can delay and revise but cannot ultimately block legislation or remove a government.
Forgetting that the government's control of the Commons rests on its majority, the whips and the payroll vote, not on any formal power over Parliament.

Active revision

Explain and analyse three differences between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. (9 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for politics (Department for Education)

The functions of Parliament#

StandardAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

The functions of Parliament

Fig. 2Parliament performs several functions; in a system of executive dominance, scrutiny and legitimation are arguably the strongest.

Parliament performs several distinct functions, and a strong answer names and explains them rather than treating 'what Parliament does' as one undifferentiated activity. The first and most obvious is legislation: Parliament is the sovereign law-making body, and no proposal becomes law without its assent. In practice, however, the government initiates and dominates the legislative programme - most bills are government bills - so Parliament's legislative role is better described as one of assent, scrutiny and amendment of executive proposals than of independent law-making. This gap between the formal and the real is a recurring theme in evaluating Parliament.

The second function is scrutiny and accountability - holding the government to account for its policies, decisions and administration. Through Prime Minister's Questions, departmental questions, select committees, debates and the work of the Opposition, Parliament exposes and challenges government action and forces ministers to explain and defend themselves. This is arguably Parliament's most important function in a system where the executive dominates law-making: if Parliament cannot make the government's law, it can at least subject it to continuous public examination. The third function, closely related, is representation - MPs represent their constituents' interests and grievances, and Parliament as a whole is meant to reflect and channel the range of opinion in the country.

Further functions complete the picture. Parliament is a forum for national debate, giving public airing to the great questions of the day and legitimising decisions through open discussion. It performs the function of legitimation - because laws and taxes are approved by the people's elected representatives, they carry democratic authority and consent, the modern descendant of the principle 'no taxation without representation'. Parliament also recruits and sustains the government: ministers are drawn almost entirely from Parliament, and it is the arena in which political reputations are made and unmade, so it acts as a 'nursery' and testing-ground for ministerial talent.

Evaluating how well Parliament performs these functions is the analytical pay-off. It legitimises and scrutinises effectively but legislates weakly relative to the executive; it represents constituents but is criticised as socially unrepresentative and dominated by party. The functions also pull against one another - the demands of party loyalty (which sustains the government) can undermine independent scrutiny and representation. The strongest answers assess the functions against the reality of executive dominance and reach a judgement about which Parliament performs well and which it performs poorly, rather than assuming it does everything or nothing.

Worked example

Assessing Parliament function by function

For each main function, judge whether Parliament performs it well or badly.

Legislation
Weak relative to the executive - the government controls the programme and usually its majority passes its bills; Parliament amends at the margins.
Scrutiny
Moderately strong - select committees and questions expose government, though the whips and the payroll vote blunt challenge.
Representation
Mixed - MPs serve constituents but Parliament is socially unrepresentative and party discipline limits independence.
Legitimation
Strong - approval by elected representatives gives laws and taxes democratic consent, which no other body can supply.

Result: Parliament legitimises and scrutinises reasonably well but legislates weakly against a dominant executive and represents imperfectly - so its performance varies sharply by function, which is the judgement a good answer reaches.

Typical mistakes

Treating 'making laws' as Parliament's dominant real function, when the government initiates and controls almost all legislation.
Listing functions without evaluating how well each is performed against executive dominance.

Active revision

Explain and analyse three functions of Parliament. (9 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: AQA AS and A-level Politics (7152) specification (AQA)

How a bill becomes law: the legislative process#

StandardAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

How a bill becomes law

Fig. 3A bill passes through both Houses; the government's Commons majority controls the outcome, while the Lords revise.

The legislative process is the set of stages a bill must pass through in both Houses before it receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act of Parliament, and knowing it precisely allows an answer to analyse where scrutiny is strong and where it is weak. Most bills are public bills sponsored by the government, but there are also private members' bills (introduced by backbench MPs, most of which fail for lack of time) and private bills (affecting particular bodies or localities). A bill normally begins in the Commons. Its First Reading is a formality - the title is read and the bill published, with no debate. The Second Reading is the first substantive stage: the House debates and votes on the general principles of the bill, and defeat here (rare for a government with a majority) kills it.

The bill then goes to its Committee Stage, where a public bill committee (or, for major constitutional bills, a committee of the whole House) examines it clause by clause and considers amendments - the most detailed scrutiny the bill receives. At the Report Stage the amended bill returns to the floor of the House, where further amendments can be made, before the Third Reading, a final debate and vote on the bill as amended (in the Commons no further amendments are allowed at this stage). If passed, the bill moves to the House of Lords, where it goes through an equivalent set of stages; the Lords' committee stage, taken on the floor, is often where the most careful line-by-line revision occurs.

If the Lords amend the bill, it returns to the Commons, beginning a process of exchange between the two Houses known informally as 'ping-pong', in which each House considers the other's amendments until agreement is reached. Because the Commons has primacy, it usually prevails; if the Lords persist in blocking a bill, the Commons can ultimately use the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 to pass it without Lords consent after a delay of about a year (money bills cannot be delayed at all). Once both Houses agree, the bill receives Royal Assent - the monarch's formal approval, granted by convention and not refused since 1708 - and becomes an Act.

Analysing this process reveals both its strengths and the reasons critics regard parliamentary scrutiny as inadequate. In its favour, the multi-stage process in two chambers subjects legislation to repeated examination and gives many opportunities for amendment and for the Lords' expertise to improve bills. Against it, the government's control of the timetable and of its Commons majority means that at every Commons stage the whipped majority can push the bill through and reject unwelcome amendments; the use of programme motions ('guillotines') can curtail debate so that parts of a bill are passed with little scrutiny; and the sheer volume of delegated (secondary) legislation escapes the full process altogether. The process therefore offers real but executive-constrained scrutiny - the balance a good answer weighs.

Worked example

Tracing a government bill through Parliament

Trace a government bill from introduction to becoming an Act, noting where scrutiny is strongest.

Introduction
First Reading (formal publication), then Second Reading debates and votes on the principle - the government's majority normally secures it.
Detailed scrutiny
Committee Stage examines the bill clause by clause and considers amendments - the most detailed scrutiny; Report and Third Reading follow.
The Lords
The bill repeats the stages in the Lords, whose expert revision often improves it; Lords amendments return to the Commons.
Resolution
Ping-pong resolves differences; the Commons prevails (ultimately via the Parliament Acts); Royal Assent makes it an Act.
Judge the scrutiny
Scrutiny is strongest at committee stage and in Lords revision, weakest where the whipped majority and guillotines override challenge.

Result: A government bill passes First/Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading in each House, ping-pong and Royal Assent; scrutiny is real at the committee and Lords stages but is constrained throughout by the government's control of its Commons majority and the timetable.

Typical mistakes

Muddling the order of the stages, or thinking amendments can be made at the Commons Third Reading (they cannot).
Assuming Royal Assent is a real check - it is a convention that has not been refused since 1708.

Active revision

Explain and analyse three stages through which a bill must pass to become an Act of Parliament. (9 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for politics (Department for Education)

Scrutiny: how Parliament holds government to account#

StandardAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

The mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny

Fig. 4Parliament scrutinises the executive through several mechanisms; select committees are the most effective.

Scrutiny - subjecting the government to continuous examination and forcing it to justify its actions - is the function through which Parliament most effectively constrains an executive it cannot out-vote, and answers should treat the mechanisms as a system, assessing the strength of each. The most visible mechanism is questioning: Prime Minister's Questions each week and departmental question times require ministers to answer for their conduct on the floor of the House. PMQs is a high-profile test of the leaders and gives the Opposition a platform, but critics note it is often more theatre than scrutiny - adversarial point-scoring rather than sustained examination.

The most effective scrutiny comes from the departmental select committees, one shadowing each government department, which conduct in-depth inquiries, take evidence from ministers, officials and experts, and publish reports the government must answer. Strengthened by the Wright reforms of 2010 - which made committee chairs elected by the whole House and members elected within parties, freeing them from the whips' patronage - select committees are cross-party, evidence-based and often unanimous, giving their findings real authority. The Liaison Committee (the chairs of the select committees) questions the Prime Minister directly. The Public Accounts Committee scrutinises the value for money of public spending. These committees are widely regarded as Parliament's scrutiny success story.

Several other mechanisms complete the system. The Opposition, and especially the Official Opposition, has the constitutional role of scrutinising and challenging the government, forcing debates on 'Opposition days' and offering an alternative government-in-waiting. Backbenchers scrutinise through debates, questions and, since 2010, the Backbench Business Committee, which schedules debates chosen by backbenchers rather than the government. Debates, urgent questions and ministerial statements compel the government to explain itself, and the ultimate sanction - a vote of no confidence - can bring a government down, though this is rare when the government has a majority.

Evaluating scrutiny means weighing these mechanisms against the forces that limit them. In Parliament's favour, select committees have grown genuinely influential, the Wright reforms reduced executive control of the Commons, and a government with a small or no majority can be defeated and closely constrained (as minority and small-majority governments have shown). Against effective scrutiny stand the whips and the payroll vote, which normally deliver the government's business; the government's control of most of the timetable; the weakness of the sanctions (committees can expose but not compel); and the tendency of MPs to prioritise party loyalty over independent challenge. The judgement a strong answer reaches is that scrutiny is real and has strengthened - especially through select committees - but remains constrained by party discipline and executive dominance.

Worked example

Model essay plan: is Parliament effective at scrutiny?

Plan a 25-mark answer evaluating whether Parliament effectively holds the executive to account.

Introduction and thesis
Define scrutiny; signal a judgement - scrutiny is real and strengthening but constrained by party discipline. Set up the mechanisms.
The strong case
Select committees (post-Wright, elected, evidence-based) genuinely expose government; the Liaison and Public Accounts Committees; small/no majorities allow defeats; the Backbench Business Committee.
The weak case
The whips and payroll vote deliver the government's business; the government controls the timetable and can guillotine debate; PMQs is theatre; sanctions are weak (expose, not compel).
Weigh the two
Effectiveness depends on the size of the majority and the mechanism: committee scrutiny is strong, floor scrutiny weaker; a large majority insulates the executive.
Judgement
Conclude that scrutiny is genuine and has improved (above all through select committees) but is confined by executive dominance and party loyalty, so it constrains rather than controls the government.

Result: A top-band plan weighs the strengthened committee system against the whips, payroll vote and timetable control, and judges that Parliament scrutinises effectively but does not control the executive - a conclusion turning on the strength of the mechanism and the size of the majority.

Typical mistakes

Overrating PMQs as scrutiny (it is largely adversarial theatre) and underrating the select committees (the real scrutiny engine).
Ignoring how the whips, the payroll vote and control of the timetable blunt scrutiny, and so overstating Parliament's power.

Active revision

Evaluate the view that Parliament is effective in holding the executive to account. (25 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: AQA AS and A-level Politics (7152) specification (AQA)

The two Houses and Lords reform#

StandardAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

Options for House of Lords reform

Fig. 5The reform debate weighs democratic legitimacy against effective, independent revision.

The relationship between the two Houses is governed by the principle of Commons primacy, expressed through statute and convention. The Parliament Act 1911 removed the Lords' power to veto legislation, replacing it with a power of delay (originally two years), and barred the Lords from delaying or amending money bills; the Parliament Act 1949 reduced the delaying power to about one year. By the Salisbury Convention, the Lords does not block or wreck legislation implementing the governing party's manifesto commitments, on the grounds that these have been endorsed by the electorate. Financial privilege reserves taxation and spending to the elected chamber. Together these confine the Lords to delaying and revising, not blocking.

Within these limits the Lords performs valuable functions that the reform debate must weigh. As a revising chamber it subjects bills to careful, expert, line-by-line scrutiny and proposes amendments that often improve legislation, many of which the government accepts. Its members' expertise - former ministers, judges, scientists, bishops, business and civil-society leaders - and the independence of its crossbenchers and of peers who need not fear the electorate allow it to raise concerns the whipped Commons may avoid. The Lords can also delay controversial legislation, forcing the government to think again, and it defeats the government far more often than the Commons - a genuine, if limited, check.

The composition of the Lords, however, is the target of sustained criticism and the driver of the reform debate. Because it is wholly unelected, it lacks democratic legitimacy: its members are appointed, some inherit their seats, and 26 places are reserved for Church of England bishops - an arrangement hard to justify in a modern democracy. Appointment through party patronage invites accusations of cronyism, the chamber is very large, and there is no retirement age, so it is criticised as unaccountable, unrepresentative and bloated. The 1999 removal of most hereditary peers was explicitly a 'first stage' of reform that was never completed, leaving the Lords in a half-reformed condition.

The reform debate offers several options, and a strong answer evaluates them against a clear criterion. A fully elected second chamber would give the Lords democratic legitimacy but risks creating a rival to the Commons and gridlock (two chambers each claiming a mandate), and might lose the independent expertise that is the appointed chamber's strength. A partly elected chamber attempts a compromise. Abolition would leave the UK with a unicameral Parliament and no revising chamber. Reform of appointment (a statutory, independent appointments commission; removing the remaining hereditaries and the bishops; a smaller chamber with retirement) would improve legitimacy without an elected rival. The judgement turns on whether one prizes democratic legitimacy (favouring election) or effective, independent revision (favouring a reformed appointed chamber) - and the repeated failure of elected-Lords proposals suggests the political system values the second more than it admits.

Worked example

Weighing an elected against a reformed appointed Lords

Assess whether an elected or a reformed appointed second chamber is preferable.

The case for election
Democratic legitimacy - an unelected chamber has no mandate to revise or delay the decisions of elected MPs.
The risk of election
Two elected chambers each claim a mandate, inviting rivalry and gridlock, and election may drive out the independent experts and crossbenchers.
The reformed-appointed alternative
An independent statutory appointments commission, removal of the hereditaries and bishops, a smaller chamber with retirement - legitimacy improved without an elected rival.
Apply a criterion
If the priority is legitimacy, favour election; if it is effective, independent revision without gridlock, favour a reformed appointed chamber.
Judgement
Conclude that a reformed appointed chamber best preserves the Lords' revising strength while addressing the worst legitimacy problems - the more defensible reform.

Result: Weighing legitimacy against effective revision, a reformed appointed chamber (independent appointment, no hereditaries or bishops, smaller, with retirement) is the more defensible option, capturing most of the benefit of reform without the gridlock and loss of expertise a wholly elected Lords would risk.

Typical mistakes

Assuming an elected Lords is obviously best, ignoring the risk of gridlock between two mandated chambers and the loss of independent expertise.
Confusing the delaying power (about a year, under the Parliament Acts) with a power of veto, which the Lords no longer has.

Active revision

'The House of Lords should be wholly elected.' Analyse and evaluate this statement. (25 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for politics (Department for Education)

How effective is Parliament? Executive dominance#

AdvancedAQA 7152/1 Section A: The structure and role of ParliamentDfE GCE Politics subject content

The mechanisms of executive dominance

Fig. 6Executive dominance flows from the fusion of powers and party discipline; its extent is contingent on the government's majority.

The overarching evaluative question - how effective is Parliament? - turns on the concept of executive dominance, and a sophisticated answer explains why the UK's parliamentary system tends to produce a strong executive and a constrained legislature. Because the government is formed from the majority in the Commons (the fusion of powers, in contrast to the US separation of powers), and because that majority is normally delivered by the disciplined party system and the whips, the executive usually controls the legislature that is supposed to check it. Lord Hailsham's phrase 'elective dictatorship' captures the fear that a government with a secure Commons majority can pass almost any legislation and faces few real constraints between elections.

The mechanisms of executive dominance are worth naming precisely. The whips enforce party discipline through persuasion, patronage and pressure; the payroll vote - the hundred-plus ministers and parliamentary private secretaries bound by collective responsibility - guarantees a large bloc of loyal votes; the government controls most of the parliamentary timetable and can use programme motions to limit debate; and First Past the Post tends to manufacture single-party majorities from a minority of the vote, concentrating power. Together these mean that a government with a healthy majority can normally expect to get its way, and Parliament's formal sovereignty coexists with the executive's practical control.

The case that Parliament is nonetheless effective, and more effective than the 'elective dictatorship' thesis allows, rests on countervailing developments. Party discipline is not absolute - backbench rebellions have grown and have defeated or forced the withdrawal of government measures, especially on matters of conscience or where the party is divided; a government with a small or no majority (as in hung or minority Parliaments) can be repeatedly defeated and must bargain constantly. Select committees, strengthened by the Wright reforms, exert influence the executive cannot ignore; the Lords defeats and delays the government; and the ever-present possibility of a confidence vote disciplines any government. Ministers must still explain and defend themselves daily, and a Parliament that is roused - by scandal, by a moral issue, or by a weak government - can be formidable.

Reaching a judgement means recognising that the effectiveness of Parliament is variable, not fixed, and depends above all on political circumstances. When a government has a large, united majority, executive dominance is real and Parliament's checks are weak; when the majority is small or absent, or the governing party is divided, Parliament reasserts itself and can constrain or defeat the executive. The strongest answers argue that the 'elective dictatorship' thesis overstates a permanent condition and understates both the recent strengthening of scrutiny and the contingency of executive power on a compliant majority - concluding that Parliament is a genuine but conditional check, powerful when circumstances weaken the executive and weak when they strengthen it. This contingent judgement, tied to the size of the majority and the unity of the governing party, is what distinguishes a top-band answer.

Worked example

Model essay plan: is Parliament dominated by the executive?

Plan a 25-mark answer evaluating the claim that Parliament is dominated by the executive.

Introduction and thesis
Define executive dominance; signal a judgement - dominance is real but CONTINGENT on the majority. Set up the fusion of powers.
The dominance case
Fusion of powers, the whips and payroll vote, timetable and guillotine control, FPTP-manufactured majorities - Hailsham's 'elective dictatorship'.
The counter-case
Backbench rebellions defeat government; small/no majorities force bargaining and defeats; strengthened select committees; Lords defeats; confidence votes.
Introduce the contingency
Effectiveness depends on the size and unity of the majority: a large, united majority means dominance; a small or divided one means a resurgent Parliament.
Judgement
Conclude that Parliament is a genuine but conditional check - dominated when the executive has a strong, united majority, assertive when it does not - so the thesis is true only in particular circumstances.

Result: A top-band plan sets executive dominance (fusion, whips, payroll vote, FPTP) against the counter-forces (rebellions, small majorities, committees, the Lords) and judges that Parliament's effectiveness is contingent on the government's majority and unity - dominated in strong-majority conditions, assertive in weak-majority ones.

Typical mistakes

Treating executive dominance as permanent and total, ignoring backbench rebellions, small/no majorities and the strengthening of select committees.
Failing to tie the judgement to circumstances - the effectiveness of Parliament varies sharply with the government's majority and unity.

Active revision

'Parliament is dominated by the executive.' Analyse and evaluate this statement. (25 marks)

Active recall

Recall the key points — then reveal.

Sources: GCE AS and A level subject content for politics (Department for Education)

Key points

Why the Commons has primacy

Key points

Assessing Parliament function by function

Key points

Tracing a government bill through Parliament

Key points

Model essay plan: is Parliament effective at scrutiny?

Key points

Weighing an elected against a reformed appointed Lords

Key points

Model essay plan: is Parliament dominated by the executive?

Sources

Parliament

Key points

Why the Commons has primacy

Key points

Assessing Parliament function by function

Key points

Tracing a government bill through Parliament

Key points

Model essay plan: is Parliament effective at scrutiny?

Key points

Weighing an elected against a reformed appointed Lords

Key points

Model essay plan: is Parliament dominated by the executive?

Sources