Negligence and the Tort of Nuisance

C buys a drink manufactured by D; it contains a foreign object and makes C ill. Advise on whether D owes C a duty of care.

1. 01Issue

   Whether the manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer.

2. 02Rule / authority

   A duty is established by analogy with authority (Robinson (2018)); the manufacturer-consumer relationship is settled by Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) under the neighbour principle.

3. 03Application

   The situation is not novel: it is directly covered by Donoghue v Stevenson, in which a manufacturer was held to owe a duty to the consumer of its product. Applying that established authority, D owes C a duty of care; there is no need for a full Caparo analysis.

4. 04Conclusion

   D owes C a duty of care as manufacturer to consumer, following Donoghue v Stevenson.

Result: The answer establishes the duty by applying settled authority, using the Robinson approach rather than a mechanical Caparo test.

A hospital fails to provide protective eyewear to a worker with sight in only one eye, who is then blinded by a flying fragment. Advise on whether the employer breached its duty.

1. 01Issue

   Whether the employer fell below the standard of care by not providing goggles.

2. 02Rule / authority

   The standard is that of the reasonable person, weighing the risk factors, including the seriousness of the potential harm (Paris v Stepney Borough Council (1951)).

3. 03Application

   The probability of a fragment injuring the eye may be modest, but the seriousness of the potential harm to a one-eyed worker - total blindness - is very grave, so on the Paris principle a reasonable employer would take extra precautions and provide goggles. The failure to do so is a breach.

4. 04Conclusion

   The employer is in breach of duty, because the gravity of the potential harm required precautions that a reasonable employer would have taken.

Result: The answer applies the objective standard and weighs the seriousness-of-harm factor with the correct authority.

D negligently causes a minor burn to C; because of a pre-existing condition, the burn develops into a serious illness. Advise on whether D is liable for the full extent of the harm.

1. 01Issue

   Whether the unusually severe consequences are too remote or are recoverable under the thin-skull rule.

2. 02Rule / authority

   Factual causation: but for the breach, no burn (Barnett). Remoteness: liability for damage of a reasonably foreseeable type (The Wagon Mound (No 1)). Thin-skull rule: the defendant takes the claimant as found (Smith v Leech Brain (1962)).

3. 03Application

   But for D's negligence C would not have been burned, so factual causation is satisfied. A burn is a foreseeable type of harm, so it is not too remote. Under the thin-skull rule, D is liable for the full extent of the injury, including the serious illness triggered by C's pre-existing condition, even though its severity was not foreseeable.

4. 04Conclusion

   D is liable for the full extent of C's injuries: the type of harm was foreseeable and the thin-skull rule makes D responsible for its unforeseeable severity.

Result: The answer applies factual causation, the foreseeable-type test of remoteness, and the thin-skull rule in sequence.

C, a homeowner in a quiet residential street, is disturbed by persistent loud noise from D's newly opened workshop next door. Advise on private nuisance.

1. 01Issue

   Whether the noise is an unreasonable interference with C's use and enjoyment of land amounting to private nuisance.

2. 02Rule / authority

   Private nuisance is an unlawful, indirect interference with the use or enjoyment of land, judged by reasonableness factors including locality (Sturges v Bridgman (1879)) and duration; the claimant needs a proprietary interest (Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997)).

3. 03Application

   C, as homeowner, has a proprietary interest. The noise is an indirect interference with the enjoyment of land. It is persistent, and the locality is quiet and residential, so on the Sturges v Bridgman approach the interference is likely to be unreasonable and a nuisance.

4. 04Conclusion

   C can succeed in private nuisance, and the usual remedy would be an injunction to restrain the noise, with damages for past interference.

Result: The answer establishes the tort's elements and applies the locality and duration factors to find an unreasonable interference.

D stores a large quantity of an industrial chemical on its land; it escapes and damages C's adjoining property. Advise on liability under Rylands v Fletcher.

1. 01Issue

   Whether D is strictly liable for the escape of the chemical under Rylands v Fletcher.

2. 02Rule / authority

   Rylands v Fletcher (1868): the defendant brings onto land and accumulates a dangerous thing, in a non-natural (extraordinary and unusual - Transco (2004)) use of land, which escapes and causes damage; the type of damage must be foreseeable (Cambridge Water (1994)).

3. 03Application

   D accumulated the chemical for its own purposes; a bulk industrial chemical is a dangerous thing likely to do mischief if it escapes; storing it in quantity is an extraordinary and unusual use of land; it escaped and damaged C's land; and damage of that type was foreseeable. All the requirements are satisfied.

4. 04Conclusion

   D is strictly liable to C under Rylands v Fletcher, subject to any defence such as an act of a stranger or act of God.

Result: The answer applies each element of the rule, including non-natural use and Cambridge Water foreseeability, to establish strict liability.